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Introduction
Having the largest television audience in the world, the People’s
Republic of China (China or PRC) is naturally a prime target for
international television broadcasters.1 Satellite television channels,
from the United States (U.S.) and Taiwan in particular, are eager to
penetrate the Chinese market. Indeed, China has experienced a
growing “siege” by satellites beaming endless television programs
into its territory since the early 1990s.
Nonetheless, the majority of China’s television viewers to date
only have access to domestic television. This is despite the fact that
the first pan-Asia direct broadcasting by satellite (DBS) service,
Satellite Television Asia Region (STAR), was fully launched in
October 1991 and is now a decade old.2 Throughout the past decade,
the efforts of international satellite television broadcasters to enter
the China market freely have been frustrated. Moreover, many
1. It is a common practice for the Chinese authorities to cite the country’s television
penetration rate but not the actual size of the national television audience. According to
the China Statistical Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese) compiled by China’s National Bureau of
Statistics, the country’s television penetration rate stood at 93.65% in 2000. Unofficial
figures said there were 335 million television households in China with a total population
of 1.195 billion in mid-2001. China - Satellite Boosts Television Viewing, China Online
(Nov. 27, 2001) (available in LEXIS). Meanwhile, in An Outline of  The Development Plan
of Radio, Film and Television Business: 2001-2010, SARFT Doc. 46 (2001) (reprinted in
China Radio and Television Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese), at 25-29), SARFT disclosed that
China’s total television audience amounted to 1 billion in early 2001. All of these figures
exclude those of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. SARFT (State Administration of Radio,
Film and Television) is currently the government department under China’s State Council
responsible for broadcasting regulation. It was formed in 1998 upon the restructuring of
the State Council, replacing the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT). In
China, the ultimate control of media policy lies with the Publicity Department (formerly
known as Propaganda Department) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). SARFT and its predecessor, MRFT, used to treat all of its documents on
broadcasting policy and regulation as internal but they were widely available in the
industry. Some documents would eventually be published in the China Radio and
Television Yearbook (in Chinese), which is an SARFT/MRFT official publication. From
time to time, the MRFT also produced in-house booklets collecting many of these
documents. Similar collections by the MRFT/SARFT have become available in bookshops
in recent years, and the Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry  (rev.
ed.) (2001) (in Chinese) is very comprehensive and handy.  In the last couple of years,
SARFT has also made some documents available on its official website
<http://www.sarft.gov.cn>. All these documents are in Chinese; the English titles are
translations by the author of this article. The latest figures published by China’s biggest
media research company, CVSC-TNS, in September 2003, indicate that China has 306
million TV households with viewers totaling 1.07 billion. See the company’s website (in
Chinese) at <http://www.cvsc-tns.com> (accessed Oct. 1, 2003).
2. In early 2001, Satellite Television Asia Region, formerly known as STAR TV,
adopted a new brand name, STAR.
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international broadcasters have in recent years readily submitted to
Chinese national broadcasting rules, including making annual
applications to the authorities for approval to reach a very limited
audience composed mainly of foreign visitors and expatriates. In
essence, the Chinese government has for the past ten years minimized
the impact of transfrontier satellite television on its nationals by
applying the country’s own laws and policies.
Such an outcome is quite contrary to predictions made in the
early 1990s. Press reports and academic researchers then recorded a
rapid spread of satellite dishes and illicit reception and retransmission
of transfrontier satellite television in China, leading to optimistic
predictions that any control by the Chinese government would soon
become ineffective.
Through a comprehensive survey of China’s legal enactments,
ministerial directives and policy speeches of high-ranking officials,
this paper gives a historical account of how the Chinese government
has successfully maintained its broadcasting sovereignty in face of the
advent of DBS, which respects no national borders. In the course of
this account, China’s insistence on the prior consent requirement will
be highlighted.
The prior consent requirement, in its original sense, imposes a
duty on the originating country to seek consent from the receiving
country before transmitting transfrontier satellite television signals. It
thus enables the receiving country to exercise control over access and
content of the incoming satellite television. This would mean the
making of agreements between nation states, which would become
part of international law regulating transfrontier satellite television.
China, like the former Soviet Union and many developing countries,
initially insisted on the introduction of an international regulatory
regime on DBS implementing the prior consent requirement.
However, without an international regulatory mechanism in place,
the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) throughout the 1990s
devised numerous national broadcasting rules to give effect to the
prior consent requirement. In devising these rules, the Chinese
government had more in mind than just the transfrontier satellite
television broadcasters. Much effort was spent, especially in the latter
1990s, on strengthening central government’s control over domestic
television, especially at the local level. This proved to be crucial in
preventing infiltration by transfrontier satellite television. In an
attempt to perpetuate the prior consent requirement, China
channeled much of its effort in the later 1990s into building a highly
controlled environment – “a single satellite in the sky, a single
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network on the ground” (tian shang yi ke xing, di shang yi zhang
wang)3 – by combining the Malaysian and Singaporean practices for
controlling transfrontier satellite television. Many international
satellite television broadcasters, hanging their hopes on China shifting
its emphasis from banning access to vetting program content, have
shown great willingness to cooperate with the Chinese authorities in
exchange for access. Their efforts finally bore fruit in late 2001,
exactly a decade after DBS was introduced in the region. The
Chinese authorities, for the first time, granted cable access to three
transfrontier satellite television operators. One of the three  China
Entertainment Television (CETV)  is owned by AOL-Time
Warner, the world’s biggest media conglomerate, based in the U.S.
The other two  STAR and Phoenix Satellite Television Co.
(Phoenix)  are both investments of media mogul Rupert Murdoch.
While international satellite television operators described this
development as groundbreaking, this paper examines the move in the
light of China’s continued insistence on the prior consent
requirement. Finally, the paper argues that China’s unilateral
insistence on the prior consent requirement has demonstrated that
neither technology nor the market mechanism alone can guarantee
media freedom and the free flow of information.
I. China and the Prior Consent Requirement
The prior consent requirement was hotly debated when the
international regulation of DBS was discussed at the United Nations
(U.N.) and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) from the late 1960s to the early 1980s.4
The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) formed a working group in 1968 to study the technical
feasibility of DBS and its implications. Some group delegates
expressed their fear that DBS technology would bring serious adverse
effects, including interference in internal affairs of other States. They
suggested “a prohibition on broadcasts beamed from satellites by one
3. See China Radio and Television Yearbook 1997 at 70 (in Chinese). The phrase is
a translation by the author of this article. The pinyin of the Chinese words is put in
parentheses for reference.
4. The details of debates on the prior consent requirement in particular and
regulation of direct broadcasting by satellite are discussed in various articles.  See generally
Kathryn M. Queeney, Direct Broadcast Satellites and The United Nations (1978); Kaarle
Nordenstreng & Herbert Schiller (eds.), National Sovereignty and International
Communication (1979); and Jon T. Powell, International Broadcasting By Satellite - Issues
Of Regulation, Barriers To Communications (1985).
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State to others without the explicit prior consent of the Government
concerned through bilateral or multilateral agreements.”5
The former Soviet Union, supported by the vast majority of
developing countries, earnestly pursued the prior consent
requirement. While the Soviet Union’s main fear of DBS focused on
on the spread of political propaganda, the developing countries were
more concerned with the adverse impact on their economic
development and cultural heritage. They nonetheless shared the same
goal to preserve the traditional sovereign right of a state to regulate
its national broadcasting system and to prevent intrusion of
transfrontier television. Arguments over DBS were closely linked to
debates on the free flow of information and agitation for the “New
World Information and Communication Order.” The U.S., the
biggest exporter of television programs, fiercely opposed the prior
consent requirement, arguing it would become a barrier to the free
flow of information. Canada and Sweden tried to mediate the
divergent views, but the positions on the principle of prior consent
were so different that no binding international treaty on the
regulation of DBS resulted despite debates extending over a decade.
Instead, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 37/92 in 1982
entitled “Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth
Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting.”6 Articles
13 and 14 of the resolution framed the requirement of prior
consultation and agreement in a mandatory manner, though the
explicit principle of requiring “prior consent” of the receiving
countries was abandoned.7
5. United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, Report of the Second Session of the
Working Group, Aug. 12, 1969, at 7, A/7621/Add.1 (Supplement No. 21A).
6. The resolution was adopted on Dec. 10, 1982. One hundred and seven countries
voted for the resolution, 13 voted against and 13 abstained. The full text can be located at
United Nations, General Assembly <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/
a37r092.htm> (Nov. 16, 1982).
7. Section J of the Resolution concerns “Consultations and Agreements between
States.” Art. 13 reads: “A State which intends to establish or authorize the establishment
of an international direct television broadcasting satellite service shall without delay notify
the proposed receiving State or States of such intention and shall promptly enter into
consultation with any of those States which so requests.” Art. 14 reads: “An international
direct television broadcasting satellite service shall only be established after the conditions
set forth in paragraph 13 above have been met and on the basis of agreement or
agreements in conformity with the relevant instruments of International
Telecommunication Union and in accordance with these principles.”  Id.
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A. China’s Position in the 1980s
China did not participate in the free flow of information debate
at UNESCO.8 Nor was she actively involved in the drafting of DBS
regulation at the U.N. In 1982, China voted in favor of Resolution
37/92 at the U.N. General Assembly, but chose not to explain its vote
on that occasion. China’s delegation nonetheless had detailed its
position on the issue of DBS regulation when China was admitted to
COPUOS as a full member in 1981:
We consider that international direct television broadcasting
should be carried out on the basis of respect for State sovereignty
and non-interference in States’ internal affairs, the established
principle of international law. Only thus can understanding and
friendship among the peoples of various countries be properly
promoted and the cause of maintaining international peace and
security be served.9
It was apparent that China leaned towards the model of prior
consent and program censorship which the Soviet Union had
proposed to the U.N.:
[W]e consider that consultations and agreement between the
broadcasting and the receiving States should contain not only the
technical arrangement in accordance with the relevant documents
of the International Telecommunication Union, but also a non-
technical arrangement concerning important interests of the
receiving State. This point should be adequately embodied in this
principle. As for the question of co-operation on the program
content, this is also an important issue, but it is not mentioned in
the proposal of the 12 countries. We hope some appropriate
proposals will be made on this after consultations.10
The issue of state responsibility was also highlighted:
[China’s] delegation supported the formulation in the text of the
draft principles that States should bear international responsibility
for activities in the field of international direct television
broadcasting by satellite carried out by them or under their
8. The delegation of the PRC replaced the delegation from the Republic of China
(i.e. Taiwan) at the U.N. in 1971.
9. Ms. Wu Dalan, Speech, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, (United
Nations, General Assembly, Jun. 26, 1981) in Verbatim Record of the 223rd Meeting, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 105/PV. 223, 18 (1981).
10. Id., in a discussion of a proposal submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Canada and
other countries.
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jurisdiction.11
China reiterated its position at a COPUOS meeting in 1982,
rejecting the argument of free flow of information and advocating the
need for prior agreement:
We have always believed that international direct television
broadcasting should be based on the universally recognised
principle of international law of respect for national sovereignty.
When the sovereignty of another State is at issue, one-sided
emphasis of the free dissemination of information, without calling
for full respect for the rights and interests of the receiving State and
without, at the same time, stressing the necessity of reaching prior
agreement with the receiving State, will not facilitate the search for
solutions and agreement. 12
From the above statements, it is clear that China insisted upon a
prior consent requirement that would involve control over program
content by the receiving country and state responsibility on the part
of the originating country. She may be considered as a faithful
supporter of the requirement. It is plain why China adopted such a
position. The ruling CCP has prevented Chinese nationals from
enjoying Western-style media freedom since 1949. No private
ownership is allowed in the media sector. Nor is there any freedom of
access to information from outside China. Though tuning into foreign
short-wave radio broadcasting or watching foreign satellite television
are seldom subject to severe punishment these days, long sentences of
imprisonment can still be incurred by those who dare to operate their
own media. To allow foreign satellite television to have an unfettered
access to the Chinese audience would mean: (1) foreign television
stations could circumvent Chinese laws and policies on broadcasting
ownership and operation, and (2) Chinese nationals could have
uncontrolled access to foreign information. Such developments would
result in the CCP losing its traditional control over media ownership
and the flow of information, controls which the Party has always
regarded as vital to its survival.
11. Mr. Huang Hua, Speech, Special Political Committee, (United Nations, General
Assembly, Oct. 29, 1981) in Summary Record of the 17th Meeting, U.N.
Doc.A/SPC/36/SR.17, 8 (1981).
12. Mr. Liu Du, Speech, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, (United
Nations, General Assembly, Mar. 26, 1982) in Verbatim Record of the 237th Meeting, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 105/PV. 237,  7 (1982).
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B. China: The Leading Defender of Prior Consent in the 1990s
China remained a firm supporter of the prior consent
requirement throughout the 1990s, despite the fact that international
debates on the principle had subsided. Indeed, the issue of
international regulation of DBS has not been on the agenda of the
COPUOS since 1982.
DBS was widespread in western Europe by the late 1980s and
became available in Asia in 1991 when STAR was launched. In
China, the ruling CCP regards the increasing volume of transfrontier
satellite television made possible by DBS as a severe threat to its
power. It perceives that Western powers, since the fall of the Soviet
Union, have shifted their infiltration efforts to Asia, especially China,
with satellite television being the best vehicle.13 A Chinese official in
charge of satellite television regulation maintained:
To permit ‘outside border’ satellite television programs to radiate
and transmit freely into a state’s territorial space equates to a
sovereign state allowing foreign countries to establish at will
television stations or other news organizations in its territory.14
The Chinese authorities, nonetheless, are aware that restrictive
measures on reception can only be temporary and may soon be
circumvented by technological advances. They maintain satellite
television regulation would best be tackled on a global basis with the
introduction of a “New World Information and Communication
Order,” or regional regulation comprising of the prior consent
requirement, agreed program standards, the right of reply, and the
establishment of organizations overseeing regulation of international
satellite television. 15
China expressed its wishes to work with Asian broadcasting
organizations to counter infiltrations of Western culture and to
promote Oriental culture.16 Though the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting
Union (ABU) endorsed “Guidelines for Transnational Satellite
Broadcasters in the Asia-Pacific Region” in 1994, the document fell
short of what China had wanted.17 The guidelines treated satellite
television in Asia as fait accompli and avoided the issue of prior
13. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1997, supra n. 3, at 29, 41.
14. See  Li Kehan, Posture and Impact of World Satellite Television Development and
Our Attitude, 4(5) China Radio and Television Academic Journal 9 (1996) (in Chinese).
15. Id. at 10.
16. See  China Radio and Television Yearbook 1994 at 42 (in Chinese).
17. 25(2) Asian Mass Communication Bulletin 8 (1995).
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consent. Moreover, the western European model of “Television
Without Frontiers” was regarded as impracticable “due to the
political discrepancies and the cultural heterogeneity in the Asian
region.” 18
With no international or regional agreement on the prior consent
requirement in sight, China cannot rely on the cooperation of
transmitting countries and instead in the 1990s has tried to
unilaterally create the effect of prior consent. China’s efforts to give
effect to the prior consent requirement can roughly be divided into
two periods: those before the mid-1990s and those since. In the first
half of the 1990s, the Chinese authorities built from scratch a body of
laws and policies dealing specifically with transfrontier satellite
television regulation. In the latter half of the 1990s, emphases shifted
to the effective implementation of these laws and regulations.
II. Giving Effect to the Prior Consent Requirement: Laws and
Policies Before the mid-1990s
To prevent transfrontier satellite television that was not
approved by the Chinese authorities from reaching ordinary Chinese
viewers, regulations were devised in the early 1990s not only
restricting direct reception by satellite dishes, but also banning
retransmission by terrestrial or cable television. It was hoped that
such regulations could both supersede satellite transmission
technology and prevent foreign satellite television operators from
establishing a satellite-cable transmission mode of reception in
China.19
A. Restricting Direct Reception of Satellite Television
Direct reception of satellite television in China was somewhat
different from that of developed countries. Satellite dishes were
mainly installed by danwei (meaning entities or units), as opposed to
individuals, on the pretext of business necessities. Such danwei can be
companies, schools and universities, factories, social organizations,
government departments, etc. Many danwei are of a very large scale,
having their own compounds that contain not only offices but also
staff quarters. Once dishes are installed, signals are often transmitted
to the quarters as a kind of fringe benefit to staff. Employees and
18. See Woo-Hyun Won, The Changing Environments Surrounding Satellite
Broadcasting in Asia Region and the Proper Responses to Them, 30th General Assembly
Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union 107, 112 (1993).
19. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1994, supra n. 16, at 252.
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their families may therefore watch satellite television for leisure and
entertainment.
The Chinese government has employed satellite technology since
1985 to improve domestic television transmission. By 1987, the
Chinese government was alarmed by the fact that more than 3000
earth stations had been established all over the country, with some
rebroadcasting foreign television programs live.20 The authorities
began drafting regulations on direct reception in that year.21
1. Joint Decree No. 1
In the wake of the 1989 democratic movement in China and the
fall of the Berlin Wall, the department then known as the Ministry of
Radio, Film, and Television (MRFT),22 the Ministry of Public
Security, and the Ministry of State Security jointly promulgated in
May 1990 China’s first comprehensive piece of regulation on the
reception of foreign satellite television.  It was entitled, “Regulatory
Measures on the Use of Satellite Ground Receiving Equipment for
Receiving Television Programs Transmitted from Foreign Satellites”
(Joint Decree No. 1).23 This was one month after Asiasat 1, the first
privately-owned satellite offering DBS services in Asia, was launched,
and seventeen months before STAR came into operation.
Joint Decree No. 1 introduced a permit system restricting
reception of television programs from foreign satellites to qualified
danwei, compounds, and hotels with real business needs. Watching
for entertainment purposes was ruled out. No recording was
permitted as a general rule. Retransmission, whether via
terrestrial/cable television or in video booths, was strictly forbidden.
Joint Decree No. 1 had several inherent weaknesses. It only
regulated reception of programs, not ownership or use of satellite
ground receiving equipment. All danwei were free to install such
equipment, but only those intending to receive television programs
from foreign satellites were required to apply for a permit. Neither
the meaning of “satellite ground receiving equipment” nor that of
20. See  MRFT, A Selection of Radio, Film and Television Working Documents - Part
I (1994) at 30 (in Chinese).
21. See  MRFT, A Collection of Administrative Regulations and Departmental Rules
on Radio, Film and Television 1988-1993 (1995) at 533 (in Chinese).
22. For descriptions about MRFT, see supra n. 1.
23. Joint Decree No. 1 is a short form used by the author. It is officially called Decree
No. 1 of MRFT, Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of State Security (reprinted in
Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (rev. ed.) (2001) at 360 (in
Chinese)). See infra n. 39 for legal status of decrees made by ministries.
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“foreign satellites” was defined.
The three ministries issued further rules four months later.24
Permits had to be renewed annually. Qualified applicants had to
submit production contracts or purchasing details of their satellite
ground receiving equipment. Shops could only sell equipment
manufactured by designated factories. Advertising of unauthorized
products was banned and no importation was allowed without
permission. Stricter rules were imposed on qualified hotels as well.
The above regulations failed to deal with specific problems
arising from Asiasat 1, and the MRFT had to devise further rules in
June 1991.25 At the time, Asisasat 1 carried not only foreign television
channels, but also those of China’s national broadcaster, China
Central Television (CCTV), and two other provincial stations. To
step up monitoring, danwei receiving these Chinese channels from
Asiasat 1, according to the new rules, had to apply for permits under
Joint Decree No. 1. It led to confusion as to whether the decree also
applied to the reception of domestic television.  Moreover, Asiasat 1,
a joint venture with Chinese funding, arguably did not fall within the
remit of Joint Decree No. 1 which supposedly only dealt with foreign
satellites.26 Further problems arose when STAR, also transmitting
from Asiasat 1, was fully launched. Based in and uplinked from Hong
Kong, STAR was arguably not a foreign television station.27 Neither
Joint Decree No. 1 nor related notices contained any provisions
regulating the reception of STAR.
Indeed, none of these direct reception regulations had much
impact on STAR. Its Chinese Channel, and MTV (Music Television)
channel to a lesser extent, became very popular in China during the
first two years of their launch. Satellite dishes sprang up all over the
24. MRFT, Notice on Certain Questions Regarding Full Implementation of
“Regulatory Measures on The Use of Satellite Ground Equipment for Receiving Television
Programmes Transmitted from Foreign Satellites,” MRFT Doc. 650 (1990) (reprinted in
Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (1997) at 318  (in Chinese)).
See infra n. 39 for legal status of such notices made by MRFT.
25. MRFT, Notice on Strengthening the Regulation of Receiving Equipment of Asiasat
1, MRFT Doc. No. 467 (1991) (reprinted in China Radio and Television Yearbook 1992-
93 at 292 (in Chinese)).
26. Asiasat 1 was owned at the time by Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd., a
joint venture between Hong Kong businessman Li Ka Shing’s Hutchison
Telecommunications, Cable and Wireless of the United Kingdom, and the Chinese
government’s investment company, the Chinese International Trust and Investment
Corporation.
27. Hong Kong was still under British rule in 1990. Yet the PRC had always claimed
its sovereignty over the colony and never considered it as foreign. See also infra nn. 44-45
and associated text, on the concept of “outside border.”
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country to receive STAR.28 Several reasons contributed to their rapid
spread. First, before STAR was launched, transfrontier satellite
television programs receivable in China were in foreign languages
without any dubbing or subtitles. Broadcast in Mandarin, STAR’s
Chinese Channel became a real alternative to state-run television
channels. Second, top Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping conducted a
tour of southern China in February 1992, urging further economic
reform and opening-up. Deng’s initiative brought a relaxed
atmosphere to all spheres, including the media industry. STAR took
advantage of this and proliferated rapidly in China. Third, STAR was
owned at the time by Li Ka Shing, a Hong Kong tycoon with very
good relations with the Chinese authorities.
Surveys commissioned by STAR claimed that its viewers across
the Asian region leapfrogged from 3.75 million households in 1992 to
11.3 million in 1993, and to 42.7 million in late 1993.29 The survey in
late 1993 also indicated China alone made up 70 percent of STAR’s
total viewers.30 Even the head of CCTV admitted that many Chinese
were watching STAR and CNN International (CNNI).31
2. State Council Decree No. 129
A tightening up of policy began in late 1993. The authorities
justified tougher regulation by citing the rapid growth of satellite
dishes and shops selling this equipment.32 However, Western
observers maintained that the threat posed by Rupert Murdoch was a
major reason.33 In July 1993, Murdoch’s News Corporation bought
63.6 percent of STAR’s shares.34 About a month later, Murdoch made
the famous remark in London:
Advances in the technology of telecommunications have proved an
unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere . . . satellite
broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry residents of
28. Based on first-hand observation by the author  in the southern Province of
Guangdong and the southwestern city of Chengdu. See also Peking Censors Dished by
Satellite TV, The Independent (London) 16 (Oct. 12, 1993), for the situation in Beijing.
29. Peter Lovelock and Susan Schoenfeld, The Broadcast Media Markets In Asia, in
Telecommunications in Asia - Policy, Planning and Development 160-161 (John Ure ed.
1995).
30. Id.
31. Yang Weiguang, Introduction, in On Television Dramas, Series on Television
(Chen Hanyuan ed. 1993) at 4 (in Chinese). Yang was the head of CCTV at the time.
32. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1994, supra n. 16, at 228.
33. See e.g. Wrinkle, Wrangle Eastern Star, Financial Times 11 (Mar. 5, 1994).
34. News Corp. in $525 M Deal for Hong Kong TV Group, Financial Times 1 (Jul. 27,
1993).
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many closed societies to bypass state-controlled television
channels.35
The then MRFT minister noted that new regulations were
urgently needed to control the reception of STAR, stressing that
Americans had a hand in the running of the station.36 However, the
Chinese authorities had more than Murdoch in mind. China was by
then within the reach of over ten broadcasting satellites, and senior
MRFT officials regarded this as dangerous. Riot incitement, and
cultural and ideological infiltration, were highlighted as possible
adverse results of foreign satellite television.37
The Chinese authorities had for some time wanted to amend
Joint Decree No. 1. To them, the decree did not provide adequate
regulation of private reception of foreign satellite television by
individuals or families, or of the production, sale, and importation of
satellite dishes.38  In October 1993, the State Council promulgated the
“Provisions Governing Satellite Television Broadcasting Ground
Receiving Equipment” (State Council Decree No. 129).39 A set of
further implementation rules was announced in February 1994.40
35. A speech made by Murdoch when launching BSkyB’s multichannel services; see
The Times (London) 5 (Sept 2, 1993).
36. CCTV, CCTV Anniversary Supplement: 1958-1993, Television Research, at 25
(1993) (in Chinese). Television Research is an in-house publication of CCTV.
37. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1994, supra n. 16, at 23.
38. Law Yearbook of China 1994 at 79 (in Chinese).
39. It was not until the 1980s that China began to put more emphasis on law making.
China’s broadcasting laws are still very primitive. They suffer from lack of clarity,
consistency and transparency. These enactments can be classified according to their
ranking within the legal hierarchy. Generally speaking, there are four tiers. The National
People’s Congress (NPC), China’s legislature, has yet to enact a Broadcasting Law, which
will be the law in the highest tier and will serve as the basic law for all other broadcasting
laws and regulations. The second tier consists of administrative regulations on
broadcasting enacted by the State Council. They are considered as laws, but of a lower
ranking than laws enacted by the NPC. State Council Decree No. 129 was the first piece of
legislation promulgated by the State Council in this area. The third tier consists of
departmental rules made by SARFT (formerly by MRFT) and approved by the State
Council. Departmental rules made by SARFT form the fourth tier. Most of the current
legal enactments on broadcasting come from the third and fourth tiers. Moreover, SARFT
issues from time to time notices of all kinds on broadcasting regulation.  The legal effect of
these documents is far from clear. Yet, since all broadcasting media in China are state-
controlled, notices issued by SARFT serve as direct instructions to broadcasters and, if
implemented fully and vigorously, their effects are often no less than laws.
40. MRFT, Implementation Rules for “Provisions Governing Satellite Television
Broadcasting Ground Receiving Equipment,” MRFT Decree No. 11 (reprinted in
Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (rev. ed.) (2001) at 364 (in
Chinese)). MRFT Decrees are in the third tier of China’s broadcasting legal enactments,
see also supra n. 39.
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These regulations created a much more rigid regime for ownership
and use of satellite dishes in China.
To begin with, the permit system was no longer confined to
reception of satellite television. Different permits were required for
production, import, sale, installation and use of satellite television
ground receiving equipment.41 Moreover it was specified that private
individuals were not allowed to install, use, sell or import such
receiving equipment.42 But provision was made for individuals with
real needs, such as those unable to receive television signals by other
means. A comprehensive definition of ground receiving equipment
for satellite television broadcasting was also given.43
Another major change was that the reception of all satellite
television programs, whether originating from “within border”
(jingnei) or “outside border” (jingwai), would be subject to
regulation.44 No definition was given to “within border” and “outside
border” television programs, yet it is apparent that “outside border”
television programs refer to programs from foreign countries, or from
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.45 China has always claimed
sovereignty over the latter three places but had so far regarded them
as under separate jurisdictions.46 The replacement of the general
terms of “domestic” and “foreign” with the specific terms “within
border” and “outside border” reflected both the complexities in
transfrontier television regulation and China’s sophistication in law
drafting.
Under State Council Decree No. 129 and its implementation
41. State Council Decree No. 129, Art. 3, and MRFT Decree No. 11, Chapters 2-4.
42. State Council Decree No. 129, Art. 9.
43. Id. Art. 2.
44. MRFT Decree No. 11, Art. 5. “Outside border” and “inside border” are
translations by the author of this article. Pinyin of these Chinese words are put in
parentheses for reference.
45. Neither the State Council Decree No. 129 nor the MRFT Decree No. 11 defined
the terms “outside border” and “inside border.” Yet the MRFT Decree No. 10,
promulgated on the same day as Decree No. 11 and entitled “Provisions Governing the
Import and Broadcast of ‘Outside Border’ Television Programs,” contains a definition of
“outside border” programs. Art.  3 of the decree defined “outside border” programs as
programs for broadcast purpose by television stations coming from foreign countries,
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. Decree No. 10 is reprinted in Handbook on Regulation
of Radio and Television Industry (rev. ed.) (2001), at 238 (in Chinese).
46. There are border controls on the flow of goods and personnel between China and
the three places, despite the return of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty. This
is largely because of the CCP’s promise to keep the capitalist system of the two places
intact for fifty years. An MRFT official told the author of this article in 1996 that Hong
Kong and Macau would still be considered as “outside border” upon their return to China.
Programs of STAR, coming from Hong Kong, belong to the “outside border” category.
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rules, any danwei may apply for installation of satellite ground
receiving equipment to receive “within border” television programs.47
But the danwei eligible for receiving “outside border” satellite
television programs are far more restricted than before.48 They have
to be danwei of higher ranking and bigger scale with real business
needs. Also allowed are qualified hotels (Grade 2 of national level, or
three star or above receiving foreign visitors), and compounds
designated as offices or residences for foreigners and people from
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Reception and transmission of
“reactionary” and “pornographic” satellite television programs are
forbidden.49 Display of “outside border” satellite television programs
is not allowed in public places such as bus terminals, piers, airports,
shops, cinemas and dance halls.50 All broadcasting and relay stations,
e.g., terrestrial and cable television stations, and MATVs (master
antenna television), are prohibited from retransmitting “outside
border” satellite television programs.51
3. Effectiveness of the Measures
Decree No. 129 and its implementation rules, taken together,
have allowed only expatriates, foreign visitors, and very few Chinese
to watch transfrontier satellite television. Average Chinese viewers
are barred from doing so and can only watch domestic television. The
regulations were seen as high profile gestures made by the Chinese
authorities to tighten control in this area: much publicity was received
both at home and abroad. For a while, these new regulations
succeeded in putting a halt to the rapid growth in the number of
satellite dishes.52 Shops on the high street selling satellite dishes
without permits virtually disappeared.53 Yet illegal sale of satellite
dishes has not been stamped out completely.54 The number of illegal
47. MRFT Decree No. 11, Art. 4.
48. Id.
49. MRFT Decree No. 11, Art. 11.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The actual number of satellite dishes in China is far from clear. When Decree No.
129 was promulgated, the official figure was 40,000. Teresa Poole, Peking censors dished
by satellite TV, The Independent (London) 16 (Oct. 12, 1993). Unofficial estimates at the
time went as high as 500,000.  See Patrick E. Tyler, Beijing Journal; CNN and MTV
Hanging by a ‘Heavenly Thread’, N.Y. Times A4 (Nov. 22, 1993). While the MRFT
certainly grossly understated the number of illegal dishes, any unofficial estimation has to
be regarded with caution, given the country’s vast size and huge regional variations.
53. Murdoch’s Star has Trouble Rising in the East, The Independent (London) 14
(Mar. 6, 1994).
54. Susan Schoenfeld, Cable Television: A Back Door to China’s Telecomunication
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satellite dishes was reported to have multiplied in 1996 in Shanghai
because of poor law enforcement and high profits.55 Meanwhile, a
clamp-down on illegal satellite dishes has become a kind of annual
operation conducted by local SARFT branches. The last massive
campaign nationwide was conducted in the spring of 1999, in
anticipation of the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre and
the PRC’s 50th anniversary. The effectiveness of these operations was
doubtful. According to official figures, the early phase of the 1999
action led to the closing down of some 60 shops and factories and the
demolition of less than 2,000 satellite dishes.56 The authorities
estimated there were some 17,000 illegal satellite dishes at the time.57
It is harder for the authorities to drive out illegal direct reception
for several reasons. First, any danwei may apply to receive  “within
border” programs. Second, the ban on private ownership of satellite
dishes is not absolute. Because 70 percent of China is mountainous,
satellites have become the major mode of television reception in rural
areas. Once installed, it is difficult for SARFT officials to ascertain
which channels such equipment is receiving. Moreover, many danwei
have powerful backing from other ministries, or their compounds are
just too big for SARFT officials to conduct successful raids. It is an
open secret that most danwei with satellite dishes legally installed for
reception of “within border” programs will also illegally receive
STAR’s Chinese Channel (replaced by Phoenix Chinese channel,
which is free-to-air, since March 1996).58 Taiwanese satellite television
programs have also become increasingly popular in eastern China in
recent years.59
Market, Intermedia 19 (June/July 1995).
55. Domestic News: In brief, China Economic Review 4 (Sep. 1996). This article
reported that dish installation services were available in Shanghai for about U.S. $360, and
that the number of users there was estimated to be nearly 10,000, 80 percent of them
individuals, with about 100 new viewers coming on stream every month. The author of this
article went to Shanghai in October that year and found the situation largely as described.
56. SARFT, Circular on Putting into Order “Outside Border” Satellite Television
Ground Receiving Equipment, SAFRT Doc. 422 (1999) (reprinted in Handbook on
Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (rev. ed.) (2001)  at 373 (in Chinese)).
57. SARFT, Notice on Further Strengthening the Work on Regulating “Outside
Border” Satellite Television Ground Receiving Equipment, SAFRT Doc. 455 (1999)
(reprinted in  Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (rev. ed.) (2001)
at 377 (in Chinese)).
58. In a 1996 trip, the author found that a pub immediately outside Shanghai’s Fudan
University was receiving Phoenix Chinese Channel. While in Beijing, the author found
that staff quarters of the People’s Daily was receiving STAR’s Movie Channel.
59. During a trip to Shanghai in the summer of 2000, the author observed illegal
reception of Taiwan satellite television, despite such illegal reception being a major aim of
the 1999 clampdown. Reception of Taiwanese television has become even more popular
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B. Ban on Cable Retransmission
As mentioned earlier, both Joint Decree No. 1 and the
implementation rules of State Council Decree No. 129 carried a
retransmission ban.60 Terrestrial television stations were subject to
further regulations governing the import of foreign programs, which
allowed no retransmission of foreign satellite programs.61 The
regulation on cable television also forbade retransmission of “outside
border” television programs transmitted by satellites.62
Throughout the 1990s, efforts to prevent television stations,
especially cable stations, from broadcasting foreign satellite television
programs were a major preoccupation for MRFT and its successor,
SARFT. Television stations in China face a chronic problem of filling
their airtime due to low production capacity.63 The problem was
aggravated by a rapid growth in number of stations and channels in
the 1980s when the central government, in a bid to improve television
penetration, adopted a policy of encouraging local governments to set
up stations using local resources.64
Comparatively speaking, the retransmission ban on terrestrial
television is more effective because these stations have always been
since then.
60. MRFT Decree No. 11, Art. 11, supra n. 49.
61. Provisional Provisions Governing the Import of Overseas Television Programs,
MRFT Doc. 817 (1990). The enactment prohibited overseas television programs include
those from foreign countries and Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan received through a
satellite ground receiving equipment. Meanwhile, Art. 10 of the Provisions Governing the
Import and Broadcast of “Outside Border” Television Programs, MRFT Decree No. 10,
lists the types of programs prohibited, amongst which are “television programs from
foreign countries, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau received directly through satellite
ground receiving equipment.”
62. Provisions Governing Cable Television, MRFT Decree No. 12, promulgated in
early 1994 (reprinted in Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (rev.
ed.) (2001) at 167 (in Chinese)); Provisional Provisions Governing Television Programs of
Cable Television Stations and Centres, MRFT Doc. 250 (1992) (reprinted in China Radio
and Television Yearbook 1992-93 at 298 (similar provision) (in Chinese)).
63. CCTV, the national broadcaster, in the early 1990s could only produce one third
of the programs aired. The production ratio dropped to 1:6 for stations at the provincial
level and 1:9 at lower levels. Liu Jiliang, On the Current Situation and Duties of Television
Propaganda, 6 Television Research 6 (1993) (in Chinese). Liu was the MRFT minister in
the mid-1990s.
64. There  was  a total of only 32 terrestrial television stations in China in 1978. The
Chinese authorities then only allowed stations to be set up only at the central government
level, provincial level and in some major cities. The Chinese authorities called it a
broadcasting policy of 2-tier operation. In the early 1980s, local stations were allowed to
be set up at city and county levels. This meant a four-tier operation, a major change of
broadcasting policy. The number of terrestrial television stations increased to 422 in 1988.
There were around 1,000 terrestrial television stations by the mid-1990s.
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under tight control. Moreover, it is impossible for terrestrial channels
to retransmit the entire content of “outside border” satellite
television channels, since this would mean replacing their own
channels. Problems lie mainly with cable stations. The growth of
cable television in China has surpassed that of terrestrial television
both in number of stations and channels.65 By late 1995, there were
some 1,285 MRFT-approved cable television stations.66 Unofficial
estimates of illegal or yet-to-be approved stations ranged from 2,000
to 10,000.67 While terrestrial television stations in China then normally
only broadcast two channels, cable television stations at the time
broadcast eight to twenty channels. Before STAR launched its
Chinese Mandarin Channel in October 1991, most cable television
stations resorted to pirated video tapes, the majority of which were
smuggled into China, to fill some 90 percent of their programming.68
It became a common practice in 1992 for cable television stations all
over China to retransmit the whole of STAR’s Chinese Mandarin
Channel and, to a lesser extent, MTV and STAR Sports.69
When Joint Decree No. 1 first imposed a retransmission ban in
1990, most cable stations simply ignored it. The State Council Decree
No. 129 was a watershed. The MRFT reported in 1994 and 1995 that
most cable television stations had replaced retransmission of STAR
with CCTV-4.70 This was closely related to the ministry’s efforts in
65. Cable television has developed rapidly in China since the mid-1980s. In the 1990s,
cable television became the main transmission mode in major cities and urban areas. By
2001, SARFT figures showed that cable subscribers amounted to 90 million.  See  China
Tops 90 Million Cable Household Mark, China Online (Mar. 27, 2001). The latest figures
published by China’s biggest media research company, CVSC-TNS, in September 2003
indicate that China has 1.15 million cable TV households. CVSC-TNS <http://www.cvsc-
tns.com/> (accessed Oct. 1, 2003).
66. Li Kehan, On the Current Situation and Future Development of Satellite and Cable
Television, a speech given at the China Cable and Satellite Television Summit (1996). Li
was an MRFT official then in charge of satellite and cable television regulation.
67. Chang Ximing, Television Industry, Competition in the Air Getting Keener, in
Current Situations and Future Trends of China’s Development 1996-1997 (Weng Jiming
et al eds., 1997) at 309 (in Chinese); see also Rowan Simons, Chinese Cable TV, Television
Asia Supplement 11 (Mar. 1996).
68. Sun Zhonrui, How to Smoothen the Regulatory Mechanism of Television, 5 Radio
and Television Decision References 27 (1992) (in Chinese). Sun was then a MRFT official.
69. Liu Yu-li, The Growth of Cable Television in China - Tensions between Local and
Central Government, 18(3) Telecommunications Policy 224 (1994). Liu’s paper cited
stations in Foshan of Guangdong Province, Chengdu of Sichuan Province and Jinzhou of
Lialing Province retransmitting STAR’s Chinese Mandarin Channel. The author of this
article traveled widely in the Pearl River Delta in 1992 and 1993 and found many local
cable television stations were retransmitting the three STAR channels mentioned.
70. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1995 at 10 and 38 (in Chinese). Interviews
and observations by the author of this article in late 1996 confirmed that the majority of
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tidying up the television industry, particularly cable television.
Nonetheless, even the ministry admits that illegal cable
retransmission of STAR has not been stamped out completely. The
ministry in Beijing makes law and policies, but relies on its local
branches for implementation. Local MRFT officials, involved in the
day-to-day operation of stations, attach more importance to profits
than to strict implementation of regulations. Indeed, many local cable
stations are neither approved by the ministry nor under its control.
This reflects not only the inherent conflicts between central and local
government, but also the challenges to the ministry’s broadcasting
monopoly from other departments.71 Furthermore, big danwei have a
tradition of operating their own cable systems. Another problem
comes from numerous MATV systems that exist all over China. The
ministry simply does not have the necessary resources to monitor all
of these cable and MATV systems.
Indeed, major regulations in place by the mid-1990s restricting
both direct reception and retransmission of transfrontier satellite
television have been widely disregarded. Joseph Chan categorized the
situation in the early 1990s as “suppressive openness.”72  Thus, the
Chinese government shared with those governments practicing
“virtual suppression” the intent to fend off foreign television, but
lacked the necessary effective control. Chan projected optimistically
that China would move from a state of “suppressive openness” into
one of “illegal openness.” Under “illegal openness,” reception and
retransmission of foreign television would still be against the law but
the government would give up attempting to suppress it when the
audience size was beyond effective policing.  This was the situation in
Taiwan then, though the evolutionary path would be interrupted by
occasional crackdowns. Lee and Wang also observed that the efforts
of many Asian nations to ban the reception of satellite television had
cable television stations in coastal provinces and major cities have stopped retransmitting
STAR.
71. MRFT, A Report on Radio and Television Inspection, China Radio and
Television Yearbook 1996 at 121 (in Chinese). Since all broadcasting stations in China are
state-owned and state-controlled, most SARFT/MRFT officials have the dual role of
regulator and operator. Nonetheless, local SARFT/MRFT officials, who are from local
government, would often attach more importance to their role as operator than that of
regulator since their stations are funded locally. This is especially so when regulatory
policies devised by the central government are in conflict with local interests.
72. Chan categorized the initial responses of Asian governments towards STAR into
four different types: (1) virtual suppression (as in Malaysia and Singapore); (2) regulated
openness (as in Hong Kong and the Philippines); (3) illegal openness (as in India and
Taiwan); and (4) suppressive openness (as in China). Joseph Chan, National Responses
and Accessibility to STAR TV in Asia, 44(3) Journal Of Communication 112 (1994).
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been futile and many had been forced to relax their restrictions.73
They noted that the proliferation of satellite dishes in China might
have come to a point where any control had become ineffective. Lee
and Wang predicted that the trend towards further deregulation and
greater openness was without doubt among Asian nations.
III. Strengthening Control Over Local Television:
Laws and Policies Since the Mid-1990s
Such optimistic projections have yet to materialize in China: the
majority of China’s television audience at the beginning of the 21st
century still have access to domestic television only. Indeed, press
reports and academic researchers have portrayed a different scenario
since the mid-1990s. Leonard and Harrison, in their survey of satellite
broadcasting in the Asian market, remarked that Asian governments
had proven to be adept and resilient in dealing with transfrontier
satellite television.  They also observed that “national sovereignty
remains essentially the victor in any battle between the nation state
and the global village,” and “the satellite service market remains a
market developing within boundaries set by state controls.”74 In his
study of China’s strategies to regulate satellite broadcasting, Hao
concluded that a national government may not be helpless in face of
foreign satellite broadcasting.75 He maintained that through careful
planning, a national government may regulate satellite broadcasters
as effectively as domestic broadcasters.
As early as 1996, Atkins highlighted a key development among
Asian states in forming links with accommodating media
corporations.76 He maintained that commercial access for television
networks was being granted on the basis of political compliance, and
entertainment and business news predominated to the detriment of
political news and discourse. Clarke also noted that in the latter part
of the 1990s, international satellite television broadcasters in their
Asian ventures had become allies of national governments and local
broadcasters.  International satellite television broadcasters were no
73. Paul Lee and Georgette Wang, Satellite TV in Asia, 19(2) Telecommunications
Policy 140 (1995).
74. Peter Leonard and Kate Harrison, Satellite Broadcasting: The Asian Market, a
paper presented to the International Bar Association Conference held in New Delhi,
India, on Nov. 2-7, 1997.
75. Hao Xiaoming, Party Dominance vs. Cultural Imperialism: China’s Strategies to
Regulate Satellite Broadcasting, 5 Communication Law and Policy 155 (2000).
76. William Atkins, Satellite TV Transforming Broadcasting, Nieman Reports 55,
Harvard University (1996).
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longer regarded as threats, but such changes occurred at the expense
of critical news coverage of the countries concerned.77
Though illicit reception and retransmission of transfrontier
satellite television has continued to grow in China over the last few
years, this article argues that the Chinese authorities at the turn of the
new century have strengthened their position in relation to
enforcement of the prior consent requirement. This was achieved by
strict implementation of the regulations devised in the first half of the
1990s. A two-pronged approach of tightening control on domestic
television and working towards the goal of “one single satellite in the
sky, one single network on the ground” was adopted.
In 1997, the State Council issued “Regulations Governing the
Administration of Radio and Television” (State Council Decree No.
228), which was by far the most comprehensive broadcasting
legislation since 1949.78 It reaffirmed traditional regulatory measures.
With the exception of educational television, no government
departments other than the MRFT could establish or operate
television stations.79 No private ownership of stations was allowed.80
Joint ventures with “outside border” individuals or organizations
were prohibited.81 Leasing or transfer of time slots was forbidden.82
More rules have been devised since the mid-1990s to strengthen
central government control on broadcasting and discourage local
development. Annual review and inspection of television stations was
introduced.83 No new stations and channels are allowed.84 Only
stations at the national, provincial, and city level may continue to
operate. Television stations at county level, whether terrestrial or
77. Judith Clarke, International Satellite Television in Southeast and East Asia 1990-
1999: From Threat to Authority to Ally of Governments and Local Broadcasting Industries,
1(2) Revista del CEID 68 (1999).
78. The State Council Decree No. 228 was the second piece of legislation on
broadcasting enacted by the State Council. The Chinese government began to draft the
Radio and Television Law, a basic law for broadcasting, in 1987, yet the drafting work has
been much delayed. The Chinese authorities eventually decided in 1995 that the time was
not ripe to enact such a basic law. The State Council instead enacted the decree in 1997.
The full text of the decree is reprinted in Handbook on Regulation of Radio and
Television Industry (rev. ed., 2001)  at 105 (in Chinese).
79. State Council Decree No. 228, Art. 11 (China).
80. Id. Art. 10.
81. Id.
82. State Council Decree No. 228, Art. 13.
83. Provisions Governing Annual Inspection of Radio and Television Stations, MRFT
Doc. (1996) 436 (reprinted in Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry
(rev. ed., 2001) at 184 (in Chinese)).
84. See China Radio and Television Yearbook 1996, at 8 (in Chinese).
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cable, have been phased out by combining them with radio stations.85
These revamped local stations are largely confined to retransmission
of programs from stations of higher levels. By curbing their
broadcasting function, the ministry hopes that illegal practices at the
local level, including retransmission of transfrontier satellite
television channels, can be stopped. As a result, by early 2001, the
total number of television stations nationwide, including terrestrial,
cable, and educational, had been greatly reduced to 651.86
The ministry has also tightened control of cable television. Cable
systems at every locality, large or small, including those operated by
danwei, must be integrated into a single network and put under the
unified control of local MRFT branches.87 These cable networks are
to be further integrated into a nationwide network for efficient
control by the ministry. The most recent move has been the forced
merger of cable, education and terrestrial television stations at
provincial and city levels.88 Every province and city in China, from
July 2001 onwards may have one television station at most, with
former cable television channels grouped under it. The authorities
hope that through the integration of cable networks and the phasing
out of cable stations, management problems posed by cable television
can be eliminated. By August 2001, the total number of television
stations in China had been further reduced to 429.89
IV. Working Towards “A Single Satellite in the Sky, A Single
Network on the Ground”
The CCP has always insisted on media monopoly by the Party.
To guard this monopoly against the invasion of transfrontier satellite
television, China borrowed much from the experience of Singapore
85. See Opinions on Merging of Broadcasting Organizations at County Level, MRFT
Doc. 458 (1997) (reprinted in Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry
(rev. ed.) (2001) at 188 (in Chinese)). This meant that the broadcasting policy of four-tier
operation came to an end.
86. An Outline of the Development Plan of Radio, Film and Television Business:
2001-2010, SARFT Doc. 46 (2001) (reprinted in China Radio and Television Yearbook
2001 at 25-29 (in Chinese)).  The document did not give a breakdown for the 2001 figures.
87. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1996, supra n. 84, at 9.
88. Approval of Opinions Jointly Prepared by the Ministry of Information Industry
and State Administration of Radio, Film and Television on Strengthening the Management
of Cable Television Network Construction, State Council Document No. 82 (1999)
(reprinted in Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (rev. ed. 2001) at
130 (in Chinese)).
89. See SARFT <http://www.sarft.gov.cn/page/sygk/gk/htm/> (accessed Jun. 22,
2002).
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and Malaysia in giving effect to the prior consent requirement.90 In
Singapore, the initial ban on direct reception of foreign satellite
television was later supplemented by retransmission of approved
channels with program-by-program censorship by Cablevision, a
government-controlled cable network.91 The Chinese authorities have
shown much interest in the Singaporean practice and hoped that a
nationwide unified cable network, i.e. “a single network on the
ground,” can perform a gatekeeping function and filter out unwanted
transfrontier satellite television programs.92
A. Building a Strictly Domestic Satellite-Cable Network
The Chinese model of controlled retransmission of transfrontier
satellite television has gone beyond that of Singapore, which allows
cable retransmission of approved foreign satellite channels in
entirety. Cable subscribers in Singapore can watch CNNI and HBO
regularly, so long these channels do not offend the government. In
China, the CCP has established a strictly domestic satellite-cable
network in the past few years. Until policy changes made in October
2001, all television stations in China could only retransmit domestic
satellite television, comprised of encrypted CCTV channels and
provincial satellite channels.93 CCTV expanded its channels from four
to eight in 1996 in an effort to “struggle against Western satellite
television.”94 It was hoped that the new channels, devoted to sports,
movies, children, science and technology, and the military, would help
local stations to fill their airtime. The provinces are another source of
domestic satellite television. By the end of 1999, all provinces and
four major cities, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhongqing, launched
their own satellite television channels. Ordinary cable television
subscribers in China only have access to local channels, most of the
CCTV channels, and a selection of provincial satellite television
channels.
90. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1994, supra n. 16, at 228.
91. See Eddie Kuo and Peng Hwa Ang, Singapore, in Handbook of the Media in Asia
(Shelton A. Gunaratne ed. 2000) and William Atkins, The Politics of Southeast Asia’s
New Media (2002), for details of transfrontier satellite television regulation in Singapore.
92. See Ai Zhisheng, A Speech Given at the National Symposium on Radio, Film and
Television Propaganda Work (reprinted in China Radio and Television Yearbook 1994 at
253-257).  Ai was the MRFT minister at the time.
93. For recent policy changes, see part VII, infra.
94. See Yang Weiguang, Certain Questions of Encrypted Satellite Television. 4
Television Research 4 (1996) (Yang was the head of CCTV at the time. The total number
of CCTV channels has since increased to thirteen, the latest being a 24-hour news channel
launched in July 2003).
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Transfrontier satellite television, as a rule, reaches most Chinese
viewers as programs offered by domestic television channels, mostly
edited and repackaged, in very limited quantities. Since 1995,
television stations at specified levels have been allowed to apply to
downlink programs from “outside border” satellite television
channels in the sports, travel, science, cartoon, children, education
and music genres.95 Still forbidden are news, current affairs, drama
and entertainment. Moreover, programs must be recorded for editing
and censorship purposes before broadcasting to Chinese viewers. No
cable retransmission of “outside border” satellite television channels
in their entirety is allowed. Another MRFT notice issued in 1996 also
specified that import of “outside border” satellite television programs
is limited to approved satellite channels and program topics.96 The
actual number of programs downlinked has been small because
stations have to follow strict conditions in their import of “outside
border” television programs, via satellites or otherwise.97 A few
“outside border” satellite television channels have made progress
since the mid-1990s in getting Chinese television stations to fill
individual program slots by satellite feeds. The most successful of
these channels has been ESPN.98 Indeed, ESPN’s live sports events
are the only “outside border” television programs not subject to
further editing before being broadcast on Chinese television. Two
other American channels, MTV and Discovery, had made deals with
major cable television stations to air some of their programs.99 NBC
95. MRFT, Notice on Issues Relating to Regulation of “Outside Border” Satellite
Television Programme Reception, MRFT Doc. 757 (1995) (reprinted in Handbook on
Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (rev. ed. 2001) at 411 (in Chinese)).
96. MRFT, Notice on Reviewing and Rectifying Some Television Stations and Cable
Television Stations’ Signing of Contracts without Authorization with Foreign
Merchandisers in Importing “Outside Border” Satellite Television Programs, MRFT Doc.
148 (1996) (reprinted in Handbook on Regulation of Radio and Television Industry (rev.
ed. 2001) at 415 (in Chinese)).
97. MRFT, Regulations on Import and Broadcast of “Outside Border” Television
Programs, MRFT Decree No. 10 (reprinted in Handbook on Regulation of Radio and
Television Industry  (rev. ed. 2001) at 238 (in Chinese)).
98. In early 2001, ESPN  stated that some 30 cable television stations in China with
an audience of about 20 million broadcast the channel’s live games, see Mark O’Neill,
CCTV Queries Rights of ESPN to Show Soccer, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),
Business Post, at 4 (Mar. 27, 2001).
99. According to China Online (Mar. 30, 2001), MTV is seen in 54 million households
via 37 cable systems. Yet SARFT’s director Xu Guangchun in an interview had scoffed at
Viacom’s own estimates of 40 million mainland audience for its MTV channel as untrue.
See China TV Takes on Western Flavour, Financial Times (Survey-China) 4 (Oct. 8, 2001).
Another report from China Online (Dec. 11, 2000) says that Discovery provides two hours
of programming to 23 Chinese cable TV stations every day.
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Asia and CNBC in 1996 made a deal with Guangzhou Cable
Television to air most of their programs, dubbed and edited, but the
venture only lasted for about a year.100
B. Placing All Television Channels onto a Single Satellite
To the Chinese authorities, a seamless control of transfrontier
satellite television can only be possible when “a single network on the
ground” is supplemented by “a single satellite in the sky.” The
ministry repeatedly stressed the need to place all domestic satellite
television channels onto one or two satellites for better regulation.101
This is especially so given the rapid development of domestic satellite
television in recent years. Indeed, Beijing initially banned provinces
from launching their own satellite television channels fearing the
spread of unapproved news items and programs.102 The restriction was
eventually lifted because of pressure exerted by provinces on the one
hand and the central government’s urgent desire to improve
television penetration of remote areas on the other. The ruling CCP
is particularly worried about the influence of transfrontier
broadcasting in Tibet, Xinjiang and inner Mongolia, fearing such
broadcasting would intensify separatist activities among national
minorities, while considering satellite television the most efficient
vehicle for delivering the party’s messages to these areas.103 In 1999,
the SARFT began to deploy direct-to-home (DTH) broadcasting, on
a trial basis, in implementing its project of “Bringing Television to
Every Village.”104 All domestic satellite television channels were
required to lease transponders from a domestic satellite, Sinosat 1,
and were offered to the public as CBTV, a non-commercial DTH
package.105 Meanwhile, the ministry has provided small subsidies to
some remote villages to install satellite dishes designed to receive
100. Based on interviews with NBC Asia staff in 1996 and 1997. See also Yin, Yang
and You: Tapping into the Asian Entertainment Market is Not Simple, Forbes (Mar. 10,
1997).
101. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1994, supra n. 16, at 34; China Radio and
Television Yearbook 1995, supra n. 70, at 25; China Radio and Television Yearbook 1996,
supra n. 84, at 8.
102. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1995, supra n. 70, at 25; China Radio and
Television Yearbook 1996, supra n. 84, at 321.
103. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1994, supra n. 16, at 254; China Radio and
Television Yearbook 2000 at 11; 2001 Radio, Film and Television Work Emphases,
SARFT Doc. 47 (2001) (reprinted in China Radio and Television Yearbook 2001  at 22-24
(in Chinese)).
104. China - Satellite TV Launch Delayed, China Online (Apr. 24, 2002).
105. Details of Sinosat 1, launched in mid-1998, can be located at
<http://www.sinosatcom.com> (accessed Aug. 2003).
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only CBTV channels.
A senior SARFT official disclosed in mid-2001 that the ministry
would soon require approved “outside border” satellite television
channels to lease transponders from a China-owned satellite too.106 In
recent years, the Chinese authorities have annually approved which
“outside border” satellite television channels may be directly received
by hotels, danwei and compounds with permits.107 The approval
scheme, though it has little impact on free-to-air channels, exercises
direct control over “outside border” encrypted channels because only
decoders of the approved channels are allowed to be imported and
sold. The SARFT has been very cautious about two types of incoming
satellite television: news channels, and those from Taiwan. Though
channels from Taiwan have applied since 1997, the ministry has so far
not approved any of them. For several years in a row, CNN was the
only news channel approved. The BBC was included for the first time
in 2001. This was hailed by the BBC as “a major thaw” in its
relationship with China.108 In 2001, there were five free-to-air and 22
encrypted channels approved, mostly entertainment and sports
channels like HBO, Cinemax, MTV and ESPN.109
106. Mr. Du Baichuan, deputy chief engineer at SARFT, disclosed this intention at a
conference on digitization of broadcasting in China held in Hong Kong in mid-2001. The
author of this article attended the conference. See also China Mulls Control for Satellite
TV ─ Plan to Redistribute Foreign Channels Could Hit International Broadcasters, Asian
Wall Street Journal 1 (Aug. 1, 2001).
107. The Chinese authorities have not publicized any document revealing when this
approval system was instituted. Sources in the industry said this approval system dated
back to 1997.
108. John Gittings, Deal Clinched as BBC and China Make Up, The Guardian 18 (Jan.
10, 2001); but see  infra nn. 160-161 (describing China’s recent suspension of BBC
broadcasts) .
109. The five free-to-air channels approved in 2001 were Phoenix Chinese Channel,
Star’s Channel V and Sports, and NHK 1 and 2. Notice on Questions concerning the
Strengthening in Approval and Management of “Outside Border” Satellite Television
Programs, SARFT Doc. 151 (2001) (available at SARFT’s website). The 22 encrypted
channels in 2001 were CNNI, HBO Asia, Cinemax Asia, CNBC, ESPN Asia, MTV Asia,
National Geographic Asia, Star Movie, Sony Entertainment, Discovery Asia, NHK
Culture and Entertainment Channel, Hallmark Entertainment Channel, Jet TV, Phoenix
Movie, TVB8, TVB Galaxy, Network of the World (NOW), Macau Satellite TV Travel
Channel, BBC World, Sun Television, Macau Five Stars Satellite TV and Macau Asia
Satellite TV. See “Outside Border” Satellite Television Channels Approved for Application
of Reception Permit in 2001 by Hotels of Three Stars or National Grade 2 or above
Receiving Foreigners, SARFT Docs. 653 (2000) and 751 (2000) (available at SARFT’s
website, accessed Jun. 23, 2002) for the above list. TV5 was added to the list in March
2002.  See SARFT website <http://www.sarft.gov.cn> (accessed Jun. 23, 2002) (in
Chinese).  For the year 2003, the number of “outside border” satellite television channels
approved for direct reception by hotels, danwei and compounds with permits have
increased to 30. They are: CNNI, HBO, Cinemax, CNBC Asia Pacific, MTV Mandarin,
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These approved channels can transmit their signals into China
via a satellite of their own choice. The Chinese authorities, if
dismayed by any of these channels, can either remove it from the
approved list or exert pressure on it to make changes.110 Moreover,
hotels, danwei and compounds with permits are instructed to block
some channels, mostly CNN and Phoenix Chinese Channel, during
sensitive times like the anniversaries of the Tiananmen Massacre.111
The Chinese authorities have for a long time wanted to devise more
efficient and centralized control over these channels. By requiring
them to be transmitted from a China-owned satellite, the ministry can
vet “outside border” programs and further encrypt them before
transmission. Once a centralized satellite platform is adopted, only
dishes designed for reception of signals from the designated satellite
will be allowed. Existing dishes are to be outlawed and demolished.
These arrangements are similar to those in Malaysia. The
Malaysian government replaced its dish ban in 1996 by a measure
allowing only the installation of satellite dishes specially designed for
receiving the country’s DTH service.  The DTH service retransmits
delayed, vetted foreign satellite television broadcasts.112 The Chinese
version is even stricter. In the foreseeable future, only danwei, hotels
and compounds with permits, very limited in number, will be allowed
to receive the approved “outside border” television channels from the
China-controlled satellite platform via DTH.113 The great majority of
viewers in China will still be confined to watching domestic satellite
channels. Moreover, the Chinese authorities hope that the new digital
DTH service equipped with advanced encryption technology will also
National Geographic Channel Asia, Star Movie International, ESPN, Channel V, Star
Sports, AXN, Discovery, Hallmark,  BBC World, NHK World Premium, JetTV, Phoenix
Movie, Phoenix Chinese Channel, TVB8, TVB Galaxy, Sun Television, NOW, Macau
Satellite TV Travel Channel, Macau Asia Satellite TV, Macau Five Stars Satellite TV,
TV5, Phoenix Infonews Channel, Bloomberg, Xing Kong Wei Shi, and Eurosportsnews.
See <http://www.sarft.gov.cn/page/zhglxx/wxpd.htm> (accessed Oct. 1, 2003).
110. TNT Cartoon Network was removed from the 2001 list soon after approval.
Market News: Television: Cartoon channel banned, China Economic Review (Mar. 13,
2001); see also infra nn. 160-161 and associated text (describing China’s recent suspension
of BBC broadcasts).
111. China Tightens Hold on Info before Tiananmen Anniversary, The Associated
Press (May 27, 1999).
112. See  Atkins, supra n. 91 (describing arrangements of transfrontier satellite
television regulation in Malaysia).
113. The Chinese authorities as a practice do not publish figures on the number of
television viewers allowed to receive these approved channels. For estimations, see China
Mulls Control for Satellite TV – Plan to Redistribute Foreign Channels Could Hit
International Broadcasters, Asian Wall Street Journal 1 (Aug. 1, 2001) and Ming Pao B4
(Jul. 26, 2001) (in Chinese).
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wipe out the longstanding problem of illegal direct reception of
“outside border” channels, free-to-air ones in particular.  Since mid-
2001, the ministry has been negotiating with transfrontier satellite
television operators concerned about the use of a centralized satellite
platform.  Massive campaigns have been launched in many parts of
China to remove illegal satellite dishes.114
C. Effectiveness of the New Measures
The success of the “single satellite in the sky” policy very much
hinges on wiping out black markets for satellite dishes and decoders.
However, since the size of DTH dishes is getting smaller, the Chinese
authorities may find it harder to conduct successful raids.
Meanwhile, Beijing has encountered difficulties in achieving its
goal of “a single network on the ground” because stations with local
support and funding are reluctant to give up their editorial and
business autonomy. Some local stations, especially those along the
coast, defy the cable retransmission ban from time to time in order to
boost subscriptions and advertising revenues. Retransmission of the
Phoenix Chinese Channel has become even more widespread than
before.115 Moreover, many local stations have repeatedly ignored the
“must-carry” rule and have refused to retransmit CCTV-1
programs.116 Nevertheless, the measures adopted since the mid-1990s
have prevented, at least for the past couple of years, the projected
complete conquest of the China market by transfrontier satellite
television. Ten years after DBS was introduced in the region, the
Chinese authorities are still able to give effect to the prior consent
114. By early July of 2002, most of the approved “outside border” satellite channels
had joined the centralized satellite platform provided by Sinosat 1. See Sinosat, Channel
Guide <http://www.sinosat.com.cn/english/company/index_pdzn.htm> (accessed Jul. 1,
2002).  For recent crackdowns, see Hui Yuk-min and Loretta Leung, Beijing Tightens
Satellite-TV Grip, South China Morning Post B4 (Nov. 2, 2001); Guangdong Clamps
Down on Illegal Reception of Satellite Television, Ming Pao  B16 (Oct. 31, 2001) (in
Chinese). SARFT issued repeated notices in late 2001 and early 2002, demanding that
local SARFT branches wipe out illegal dishes. One such notice was issued jointly in March
2002 by six ministries and departments (SARFT, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of
Information Industry, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, General
Administration of Customs and State Administration for Industry and Commerce). See
SARFT <www.sarft.gov.cn/> (accessed Jun. 23, 2002).
115. See  also descriptions in the next section.
116. It has become an annual practice for SARFT to issue a notice reminding local
stations of their obligation to retransmit CCTV-1 programs.  See Propaganda Department
of CCP’s Central Committee and MRFT, Notice on Mandatory Retransmission in Full of
Programs of Central People’s Radio and CCTV by Local Radio Stations and Television
Stations, MRFT Document 836 (1993) (reprinted in Handbook On Regulation of Radio
and Television Industry at 313 (rev. ed., 2001) (in Chinese)).
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requirement.
V. Impact of the Prior Consent Requirement
The impact of China’s de facto prior consent requirement has
been significant. For the past decade, the authorities have been able
to prevent most viewers from watching transfrontier satellite
television programs and to shield the Chinese television industry from
foreign competition.
A. Impact on “Outside Border” Satellite Television Channels
So far, transfrontier satellite television operators have not
benefited much from DBS technology in penetration of the China
market. In an attempt to secure a foothold, some tried to appease or
collude with the Chinese authorities. A high-ranking MRFT official
highlighted tactics employed by transfrontier satellite television
operators.  These tactics included avoiding sensitive issues, consulting
the Chinese authorities on the editorial line, allowing Chinese
television stations to censor and revamp their programs, and even
assisting in devising more advanced censoring mechanisms.117 Such
measures, very much in line with collusive practices adopted by
foreign television broadcasters in other Asian states, have gone
beyond normal trade practices and have sacrificed the editorial
independence cherished in the western world.118
Yet this appeasement has achieved little. The only exception has
been the Phoenix Chinese Channel, which is widely regarded in
China as one of “our” channels. The channel, replacing STAR’s
Chinese Channel, was launched in 1996 by Phoenix Satellite
Television Co. (Phoenix), in which News Corporation initially had a
holding of 45 percent.119 Officially, the remaining shares were held by
Hong Kong companies, yet rumored connections ranged from CCTV
to the People’s Liberation Army.120 The chairman of Phoenix, Liu
Changle, and some senior executives were formerly with China’s
117. China Radio and Television Yearbook 1995, supra n. 70, at 58.  The author of this
article talked to executives in the industry and found that such thinking and practices are
widespread.  See also Murdoch Offers “Censor” to China, The Independent (London) 1
(Dec. 29, 1994).
118. See Atkins, supra n. 76; Clarke, supra n. 77.
119. The holding was reduced to about 38 percent upon listing. The STAR’s Chinese
Channel is still available in the Taiwan market.
120. See, e.g., Murdoch, Mainland Military in STAR Deal, South China Morning Post 1
(Mar. 13, 1996); Phoenix Says Connections Will Help Stave Off Rivals, Financial Times 28
(Nov. 1, 2001); infra n. 121. The author also came across similar remarks in several
interviews.
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national and provincial broadcasters.121 The channel, very much
tolerated by the Chinese authorities, has been retransmitted in its
entirety by some cable stations in the Guangdong Province,
neighboring Hong Kong, since June 1997.122 Several other channels
have since been added to the Phoenix brand name and the company
became listed in Hong Kong in late 2000. The success of Phoenix in
China has been widely attributed to its strong backing, good
connections, and cautious editorial policy.123
The Phoenix venture had helped Murdoch outdo other “outside
border” satellite television operators in their entry to the China
market. It achieved this by injecting a strong Chinese influence.
Indeed, Murdoch, for the past decade, has been the keenest among
“outside border” satellite television operators in building good
relationships with the Chinese authorities.124 STAR had made it clear
121. Phoenix Rising: A Former Propaganda Chief is Changing the Face of Chinese TV,
Asiaweek 1 (Mar. 9, 2001).
122. According to Phoenix’s Prospectus <http://www.hkgem.com/newslistings/
prospectus/e_8002_pro_20000621chap008.pdf> (2000) at 28, the approval, not in written
form, was granted informally by MRFT’s Guangdong branch and endorsed by the
ministry in Beijing. Since the arrangement is informal, Phoenix admits that the ministry
can stop retransmission at will at any time. The arrangement is similar to the province’s
cable retransmission of Hong Kong terrestrial television. The law does not allow cable
retransmission of “outside border” television, terrestrial or satellite. Yet, in an effort to
discourage viewers in Guangdong from erecting antennas to receive terrestrial television
across the border from Hong Kong, the ministry has informally allowed cable
retransmission of Hong Kong television in the province. Serving as gatekeeper,
Guangdong cable television filters out unwelcome news items from Hong Kong on a daily
basis. News items on Taiwan, Tibet and those criticizing Chinese leaders and policies are
generally banned. Since the outlawing of Falun Gong in China, news items on the group
coming from “outside border” are also banned. See also infra n. 161 (concerning the
suspension of BBC’s transmissions in mid-2002 for broadcasting a news item on Falun
Gong).
123. Liu Changle noted people at Phoenix had been extremely careful about what
content they would bring into mainland China. China’s Law Put Media Firms in Limbo,
The Wall Street Journal A18 (Jun. 22, 2000); see also Phoenix Rising: A Former
Propaganda Chief is Changing the Face of Chinese TV, supra n. 121.
124. In April 1994, STAR dropped BBC World, whose documentaries on Mao
Zedong and Chinese labor camps had very much antagonized Beijing, off its northern
beam. Tony Walker, BBC Feels Chill From China, Financial Times 4 (May 23, 1994).
Other friendly gestures of Rupert Murdoch included publication of a biography of Deng
Xiaoping written by one of his daughters, scrapping the deal with the last Governor of
Hong Kong, Chris Patten, to publish his memoirs, setting up a production house in
Tianjin, and assisting People’s Daily in developing electronic publishing and data retrieval.
Murdoch Dreams of a Chinese Empire, The Independent (London) 10 (Jan. 10, 1997);
Patten Sues over Scrapped Book Deal, BBC News Online: UK (Feb. 27, 1998); Star TV
Losses are Just a Beginning, South China Morning Post 4 (May 12, 1996); and Tony
Walker, Murdoch’s China Ambitions Boosted by News Corp Deal, Financial Times 1 (Jun.
14, 1995).
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that its philosophy was accommodation, not confrontation, and that it
would present programming popular with governments in its
footprint.125 Murdoch’s son, James, who has become chairman and
chief executive of STAR, emphasized the need for foreign companies
to adopt a cautious approach and be sensitive to the local political
environment.126
B. Impact on Chinese Viewers
On a positive note, transfrontier satellite television has resulted
in a wider and more stratified flow of information in China. The
privilege of access to information is no longer confined to the Party
elite. Several tiers of television viewers, enjoying different degrees of
access, have emerged. The first tier is composed of those who enjoy
direct reception of transfrontier satellite television programs legally.
These include Chinese working in foreign enterprises, designated
hotels, qualified government departments and enterprises, or major
media organizations. As of 2001, they can receive a total of 27
approved “outside border” satellite television channels, including
CNNI and BBC. This tier of audience is privileged among Chinese
nationals. Its size has grown considerably over the years because of
China’s further opening up and its continued growth in foreign trade
and business.
The second tier consists of friends, family members, relatives,
and colleagues from other departments of the first tier audience.
They enjoy a similar degree of access to “outside border” satellite
channels, either because their offices or living quarters are situated in
the same compound or simply because they pay frequent visits. This
tier is much bigger than the first tier.
The third tier is made up of those who have access to “outside
border” channels for other reasons. Satellite dishes, installed legally
or not, are used illegally to receive the Phoenix Chinese Channel or
Taiwanese channels. The majority of this tier knows very little foreign
language or none at all. The mode of reception is mainly collective, in
residential compounds of cities or in remote villages. Also in this tier
are viewers in some parts of Guangdong Province who have been
125. See  Star Wars, Cable World 52-53 (Nov. 29, 1993).
126. Foreign Media Must Not Offend, Hong Kong iMail B4 (May 11, 2001). James
Murdoch, on another occasion, stirred a row by openly agreeing with the Chinese
government’s branding of Falun Gong as a “dangerous and apocalyptic” cult and
attacking the Hong Kong and western media for their negative portrayal of China.
Murdoch Heir Slams Falun Gong, HK, Western Media Hit in Broadside, Hong Kong iMail
A2 (Mar. 24, 2001).
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able to watch Phoenix Chinese Channel via cable television since
mid-1997. This tier is again much larger than the first two tiers. In
2001, those with access to Phoenix Chinese Channel had a wide
choice of programs including CBS’s “60 Minutes” and live coverage
of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S.
The rest of the viewers in China make up the bottom tier, with
access to domestic satellite-cable television only. Some may have the
opportunity to watch programs from ESPN, MTV, or Discovery, if
their cable television stations have deals with the channels.
No accurate means are available to measure the actual size of
each tier of viewers. Phoenix Chinese Channel claimed to have an
audience of 42 million households in 1999, with some 147 million
viewers.127 This only represents some 13.1 percent of China’s total
audience. In other words, the Chinese authorities are still able to
prevent the remaining 86.9 percent, the bottom tier, from watching
“outside border” satellite television channels. Their access to
information outside China, particularly uncensored news items, has
been severely restricted as a result. Beijing journalist Gao Yu gave a
vivid account of how frustrated she was with the city’s television on
the evening of September 11, 2001.128 She complained bitterly that
China’s tight control and censorship of television made fools of its 1.3
billion nationals.
C. Impact on China’s Television Industry
Competition from “outside border” satellite channels has
effectively been fended off in the past decade. During the period,
China’s domestic satellite television has grown rapidly. Yet this
growth has been in terms of quantity, not quality. The Chinese
authorities have repeatedly called for production of quality domestic
127. Phoenix Prospectus, supra n. 122, at 28 and 69. A summary of the survey results
can also be located at Phoenix’s website.
128. Gao Yu, Making a Fool of 1.3 Billion Chinese, Open Magazine  at 34-5 (Oct.
2001) (in Chinese). When Gao learnt of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. at around 10 p.m.
(Beijing time), upon receiving a phone call from her brother who was watching Phoenix
Chinese Channel, she searched some fifty available channels, all domestic, and found none
of them was covering the attacks. According to Gao, it was not until after 11 p.m. that
Shanghai Satellite Television, which apparently did not follow the standard practice,
began to broadcast some pictures of the attacks and it remained the only channel to do so
that evening. Later that night, Beijing Satellite Television broke the news by carrying a
report from Xinhua, China’s official news agency: some 70 words in total without any
images. Gao noted that many people in Beijing did not learn of the attacks until the next
day and some even thought the attacks had occurred in the morning of twelfth. Gao, a
journalist from Beijing, was imprisoned twice by the Chinese authorities, for her
participation in the 1989 Democratic Movement and for allegedly leaking state secrets.
2003] CHINA AND THE PRIOR CONSENT REQUIREMENT 297
television programs, especially dramas and cartoons, as the ultimate
solution to infiltration by western television. Yet little has been
achieved in this respect. The broadcasting media, though much more
sophisticated and diversified than a decade ago, cannot shed their
major role as the Party’s mouthpiece and propaganda machinery, and
have so far remained under the tight control of CCP. CCTV has
always enjoyed a monopolistic position in China, and there is still
only one national television network for the entire country. All other
provincial and city television stations, until very recently, were
forbidden to form conglomerates, not to mention building other
national networks. The director of SARFT, Xu Guangchun,
confessed Chinese television stations are far behind the American
television channels in terms of size and competitiveness.129
VI. Recent Changes: Liberalizing Control
in the Near Future?
Though China has succeeded in giving effect to the prior consent
requirement throughout the past decade, its officials in charge of
broadcasting policies, as mentioned earlier, have expressed worries
about the effectiveness of restrictive measures in the long run.
Indeed, technological advances have further weakened China’s media
Great Wall, the most obvious example being delivery of video via the
Internet. Beijing has announced rules over the past few years banning
unauthorized ventures in this area and regulating the Internet.130 The
other major worry repeatedly mentioned by SARFT is the impact of
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the
country’s television industry. The ministry stressed that broadcasting,
unlike telecommunications, is under no obligation to be opened up to
foreign investors, yet it was alarmed by the huge size of the
international media conglomerates and their determination to enter
129. Xu Guangchun, A Report Presented to the National Working Meeting on Radio,
Film and Television (reprinted in China Radio and Television Yearbook at 5-12 (2001) (in
Chinese)).
130. SARFT, On Strengthening the Regulation of Radio, Film and Television Programs
Transmitted to the Public via Information Networks (SARFT Decree No. 1), promulgated
in October 1999. The Chinese authorities have stepped up content regulation and security
surveillance of Internet services in 2000 and 2001 by promulgating a number of legal
enactments. For an account of these legal enactments and their impact, see Amnesty
International, State Control of the Internet in China, AI Index: ASA 17/007/2002
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engasa170072002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRI
ES\CHINA?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\CHINA> (Nov. 26, 2002). The Chinese
text of these legal enactments can be located at China Internet Network Informaiton
Center  <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/policy/http://www.cnnic.net.cn/policy/> (accessed Sep.
30, 2003).
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the Chinese market.131 Indeed, the opening up of telecommunications
in the age of convergence may have a far-reaching impact on China’s
broadcasting operations.
Against this background, SARFT has apparently made
significant modifications to its transfrontier satellite television policy
in late 2001 by opening up cable access to “outside border” satellite
television channels, albeit in a very limited way. It struck several deals
with “outside border” satellite television operators in the autumn of
2001, which have attracted much publicity abroad. In mid-October,
Xu Guangchun, director of SARFT, announced that the ministry
would officially allow Phoenix’s Chinese channel and movie channel
to be retransmitted over cable networks in the Pearl River Delta area
of Guangdong Province.132 Phoenix has thus become the first “outside
border” satellite television operator gaining official approval for
cable retransmission in China. A few days later AOL Time Warner
was given official approval to have its CETV retransmitted under an
arrangement similar to Phoenix’s two channels.133 As Xu noted, this
was the first time a foreign television organization had been granted
cable television carriage rights in mainland China.134 The president of
Hong Kong-based Turner Broadcasting System Asia Pacific, Steve
Marcopoto, who had negotiated the deal, described the venture as
“groundbreaking.”135 Less than a week later, in early November,
CCTV formed a joint venture in Hong Kong with the territory’s
leading broadcaster, TVB (Television Broadcasts Ltd.). The most
131. For the ministry’s expression of alarm, see SARFT, An Outline of the
Development Plan of Radio, Film and Television Business: 2001-2010, SARFT Doc. 46
(2001) (reprinted in China Radio and Television Yearbook at 25-29 (2001) (in Chinese)).
Broadcasting services are being differentiated from telecommunications services in the
WTO arrangements. See 2(b) of the Annex on Telecommunications to the 1994 General
Agreement on Trade in Services, which says the annex “shall not apply to measures
affecting the cable or broadcast distribution of radio or television programming.”
132. Phoenix TV Given Go-ahead to Broadcast in Southern Guangdong, China Online
(Oct. 19, 2001) (available 2001 WL 14483130). As of September 2003, only the  Phoenix
Chinese Channel has been allowed cable retransmission in Guangdong. The
retransmission of Movie Channel has yet to be approved. Meanwhile, MTV has been
allowed cable re-transmission in Guangdong since April 26, 2003. MTV officially Landing
in Guangdong, SinoCast China Business Daily News (May 12, 2003) (available in LEXIS,
News library / Most Recent Two Years (English, full text) database).
133. James Kynge, AOL Time to Broadcast in China, Financial Times 38 (Oct. 23,
2001).
134. Since AOL Time Warner is from the U.S., it is both  “foreign” and “outside
border.” Phoenix TV is from Hong Kong, so it is only “outside border” not “foreign.”  See
supra n. 45 (meaning of “outside border”).
135. Steve Donahue, AOL Time Warner Net Gains Access to China, Multichannel
News at 3 (Oct. 29, 2001).
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prominent feature of the deal was that the joint venture would launch
a new satellite television channel in 2002. This will be the first time
that CCTV has owned and operated a satellite television channel
jointly with an “outside border” organization. In December 2001,
Murdoch’s STAR was given permission for cable retransmission in
Guangdong, for a new entertainment channel specially designed for
Chinese viewers.136  As STAR put it, this was the first time China had
granted an entirely new channel cable carriage in the country.137
Yet a closer look would reveal these deals are not that
“groundbreaking.” As noted earlier, Phoenix Chinese Channel has
already been allowed cable access in some parts of Guangdong since
mid-1997. AOL Time Warner bought the financially-troubled CETV
recently. The channel in the past claimed that it maintained a good
relationship with the Chinese authorities and was able to secure
retransmission by some cable stations.138 The deals therefore merely
legalized the longstanding practice.139 Moreover, Marcopoto of
Turner made it clear that AOL Time Warner wanted to offer Chinese
viewers a channel that would not offend their cultural or political
sensibilities, and that CETV would continue to steer clear of news.140
It was China who got what it most wanted from the deals, not the
transfrontier satellite television operators. AOL Time Warner
agreed, as a reciprocal arrangement, to carry CCTV-9, an English
channel targeting overseas audiences, on its New York, Los Angeles
and Houston cable systems.141 CCTV-9 will also be carried on the
News Corp.’s Fox Cable Network in the U.S. in return for STAR’s
136. Yasmin Chahremani, Rupe’s Star Gets OK for Mandarin Cabler, 385 No. 6,
Variety, at 18 (Dec. 24, 2001). The new channel, named Xing Kong Wei Shi (or Starry
Sky) was launched on March 28, 2002.  See  Wendy Kan,  Rupe’s Starry Sky Covers China,
386 No. 8 Variety at 28 (Apr. 8, 2002). As of September 2003, television viewers in
Guangdong can receive via cable four “outside border” satellite television channels: Xing
Kong Wei Shi, MTV, CETV, and the Phoenix Chinese Channel.
137. STAR Granted Landing Rights for a New Channel in China, STAR press release
(Dec. 19, 2001).
138. Dan Boylan, CETV’s Formula for Success: No Sex, No Violence, No News, Asia
Cable And Satellite World 12 (Oct. 1997).
139. As mentioned earlier, MRFT rules devised before mid-1990s explicitly forbade
cable retransmission of “outside border” satellite television channels. Yet State Council
Decree No. 228, enacted in 1997, paved the way for legalizing cable retransmission. Art.
41 of the Decree says: “Radio stations, television stations which import or retransmit
‘outside border’ radio or television programs via satellite, must obtain approval from State
Council’s ministry responsible for radio and television.” (in Chinese)
140. Mark Landler, AOL Gains Cable Rights in China by Omitting News, Sex and
Violence, N.Y. Times C11 (Oct. 29, 2001).
141. Joe McDonald, AOL Time Warner Inks Landmark Deal, The Associated Press,
BC cycle (Oct. 22, 2001).
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cable deal in Guangdong.142 As for Phoenix, it has formed a joint
venture with CCTV to bring CCTV-4, a Mandarin channel targeting
overseas Chinese, on mainstream U.S. satellite television platforms
and to produce programs for Chinese-speaking viewers worldwide.143
In the deal with TVB, the new satellite television channel would be
categorized as “outside border” because the joint venture is to be set
up in Hong Kong. In relation to the prior consent requirement, these
deals demonstrate China’s ability to require transfrontier satellite
television operators, in lieu of transmitting countries, to agree and
submit to the country’s consent on both access control and program
censorship.
Meanwhile, some mainland Chinese newspapers projected
possible further opening up of the Chinese television market to
international broadcasters. The New Express, a newspaper belonging
to CCP’s Guangdong committee, reported that the central authorities
would soon allow over 30 “outside border” television channels to be
retransmitted in parts of Guangdong, making the region a “special
media zone” for transfrontier television.144 In the same report, a
communication studies professor from Beijing remarked that the
proposed zone could serve as a buffer before China inevitably opens
up to foreign media. Such an arrangement would allow Chinese
media opportunities to learn from foreign media and at the same time
alleviate the impact of Western culture. If the zone were to be
implemented, it would join the other measures adopted by SARFT in
response to the challenges posed by technological advances and
general opening up of China’s markets due to its entry into WTO.145
Yet the report did not specify the time frame and no confirmation or
denial has so far been made by Beijing. Another press report has said
sources in the industry are speculating that SARFT would soon allow
all the approved “outside border” satellite television channels to
reach the mass Chinese audience in the form of pay television.146
It is far from clear how likely these projections are to materialize
in the near future. The Chinese authorities may prefer to wait for a
142. Ghahremani, Rupe’s Star Gets OK for Mandarin Cabler, supra n. 136.
143. Phoenix-CCTV Venture to Export Chinese Programming, China Online (Oct. 31,
2001).
144. See  Guangdong Plans to Build Media Special Zone, Ming Pao B14 (Oct. 30,
2001) (in Chinese), and Guangdong in Foreign TV Boom, Hong Kong iMail A5 (Oct. 31,
2001).
145. The most prominent proactive measure has been SARFT’s instruction for
provinces and big cities to consolidate their resources by forming media conglomerates.
146. Pay TV Coming Soon, Foreign Media Watching Out for Business Opportunities,
Yangzi Wan Bao (Jun. 7, 2002) (in Chinese).
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while and see how Phoenix, AOL Time Warner’s CETV and STAR’s
new channel perform. Indeed, some other important gestures and
moves of the Chinese authorities during the same period should be
highlighted if a more accurate scenario is to be portrayed. Around the
same time, CCP and SARFT jointly issued an important reminder
about media reform, stressing that “under no circumstances can the
role of news media as the mouthpiece of CCP and the people be
changed,” and that the regulation of satellite television ground
receiving equipment and downlinking of “outside border” satellite
television programs must be strengthened.147 Additionally, SARFT
promulgated in December 2001 an important legal enactment on the
regulation of “outside border” satellite television. The combined
effect of these two actions indicated that China is still trying very hard
to implement its prior consent requirement on “outside border”
satellite television.
The legal enactment is entitled “Provisional Measures on
Approving and Managing the Landing of  ‘Outside Border’ Satellite
Television Channels” (SARFT Decree No. 8).148 This is the first time
that the Chinese authorities have produced legislation with detailed
rules that  “outside border” satellite television channels have to
follow if they are to get approval for downlinking their signals in
China. Article 2 says that this Decree applies to satellite television
channels established outside mainland China, and has thus indirectly
defined what is “outside border.” Additionally, an annual application
has to be made.149 Upon approval, landing can take place in hotels of
three stars or above receiving foreigners, compounds designated as
offices or residences for “outside border” personnel, and other
specified areas.150 The term “other specified areas” marks a departure
from the previous policy which only allowed danwei with real
business needs to receive these television signals, and paves the way
147. This reminder, entitled Some Opinions on Deepening the Reform of News,
Publishing, Radio and Television Industry, was jointly issued by the Publicity Department
of the CCP’s Central Committee, SARFT and the State Press and Publication
Administration. This reminder covered nearly all recent issues and policies about China’s
media. This was an internal document, but its content was widely reported in the press in
early 2002. See News Media State Operates, Chinese Officials Detailing Media Industry
Reform China News Service, Jan. 16, 2002 (online version in Chinese), and China
Continues Ban on Foreign, Private Funding of News Media, China Online (Jan. 16, 2002).
148. The text of the Decree, effective Feb. 2002, can be located on SARFT’s official
website.
149. See  SARFT Decree No. 8, Art. 3 and 9.
150. Id. Art. 4.
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for possible liberalization in the future.151 Yet “outside border”
channels are subject to strict conditions. To qualify for application,
the channel concerned has to be a major broadcaster in the
originating country/region and among the top three in television
audience ratings.152 Moreover, the channel has to promise to actively
assist Chinese television programs to be downlinked overseas.153 On
top of these, the channel has to be friendly to China and actively
promote broadcasting exchanges and co-operation.154 Moreover,
programs broadcast by the channel cannot violate Chinese laws.155
Another condition is to allow SARFT’s authorized dealer to have the
sole right of distribution of the channel in China and agree not to
employ any other means of downlinking.156 In principle, only one
channel from one broadcasting organization will be allowed.157 No
transfrontier news channels will be allowed at all in China.158 Also
excluded are those “outside border” channels set up by the SARFT
and related parties.159 Yet there is a proviso to these two categories of
prohibitions, allowing approval in special circumstances.160 Permission
for landing will be revoked if the channel is found broadcasting any
content violating Chinese laws three times in a year.161 Once
151. The Chinese authorities at the same time promulgated another legal enactment
entitled Provisional Measures Governing the Management of Cable Television Systems in
Urban Communities (SARFT Decree No. 7). This decree, the full text of which can be
located at the SARFT website, applies only to residential compounds and staff quarters of
danwei for mainland Chinese (i.e., it is not applicable to compounds designated for
“outside border” personnel). These communities are required to be connected to a
SARFT-controlled cable network. They are not allowed to set up “outside border”
satellite television ground receiving equipment, or to receive and transmit “outside
border” television programs.
152. SARFT Decree No. 8, Art.  5(2).
153. Id. Art. 5(3).
154. Id. Art. 5(4).
155. Id. Art. 5(1).
156. Id. Art. 5(5).
157. Id. Art. 11.
158. Id; see also remarks at infra nn. 160-161.
159. Id. Currently there is no such channel. Yet the new channel to be jointly set up by
TVB and CCTV in Hong Kong will be considered as “outside border” and will fall into
this category. There are two possible reasons for such a prohibition. First, Chinese
authorities might have foreseen that such channels, in order to compete in markets
elsewhere, would contain programs not allowed in mainland China.  Alternatively,
Chinese authorities might simply try to prevent domestic television channels from
circumventing censorship rules at home by setting up new channels “outside border.”
160. Id. This proviso shows how flexible, or indeed uncertain, laws in China can be.
Whether news channels like CNNI or BBC World can have landing rights in China
depends very much upon the discretion of the Chinese authorities.
161. SARFT Decree No. 8, Art.  15. The BBC has become the first “outside border”
satellite channel to have its landing right suspended because of content violations under
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disqualified, no fresh application will be allowed for three years.162
Judging from rules stipulated in this decree, it is very clear that
“outside border” channels applying for landing approval have
virtually no bargaining power over access or program content, and
the only immediate benefit is “to be there” in the promising China
market. Indeed, this enactment together with the proposed
compulsory centralized satellite platform indicated that the Chinese
authorities are still clinging hard to the goal of “a single satellite in
the sky, a single network on the ground” and can in the near future
exercise tighter control over transfrontier satellite television. It is
likely that China will try to maintain its insistence on prior consent
unless there are major changes in policies or Chinese leadership.
International television operators’ success in the China market in the
foreseeable future will still very much depend upon their collusion
with the authorities and their submission to censorship. As a
Financial Times editorial comment put it, the new prospects
surrounding recent cable retransmission approvals demonstrate that
the kowtow still works.163
VII. Conclusion
The impact of the Chinese authorities’ insistence upon the prior
consent requirement on the freedom of information and the free flow
of information has been significant. For the past decade, the
combined effect of DBS technology and China’s further opening up
to a market economy has only benefited a very small sector of
China’s population. The majority of Chinese viewers have been
confined to watching domestic television only. The prior consent
requirement was achieved, not by reaching agreements with
transmitting countries, but through unilateral application of China’s
own national broadcasting laws and policies and the co-operation and
the new centralized satellite platform arrangements. Transmission of the BBC from
Sinosat 1 was switched off by the Chinese authorities in early July of 2002. A foreign
ministry spokesman maintained that the BBC had repeatedly violated an agreement with
the China International Television Corporation, and noted that China was willing to allow
the broadcaster to resume limited broadcasting rights within China as long as it takes
measures to resolve broadcast violations. The BBC had repeatedly run on its hourly news
bulletin a story about the banned Falun Gong over June 30 and July 1, 2002, as part of its
coverage of the fifth anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty. China to
Allow BBC to Resume Broadcasting When It Fixes “Violations”, AFX News (Jul. 12, 2002)
(available in LEXIS). Meanwhile, a BBC spokeswoman confirmed that other satellites are
continuing to bring the BBC into China.  China Axes BBC after Falun Gong Item,
Associated Press (Jul. 5, 2002).
162. Id.
163. Tune Into China, Financial Times 16 (Sept. 5, 2001).
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submissiveness of international satellite television operators.
There have been predictions in the 1980s that the advent of DBS
would make any prior consent requirement superfluous: “[N]either
national frontiers nor the political wills of the governments affected
will . . . be able to prevent distribution of satellite-broadcast
programs.”164 Similar arguments could be found in Asia in the early
1990s, especially with regard to the role of STAR TV: “STAR TV has
set an Asian precedent that potentially defies the ‘prior consent’
principle. . . . If the virtually mute response to STAR TV on the
international level continues, it will serve as a tacit recognition of the
breakdown of the prior consent principle.”165
Such predictions turned out to be half-true. DBS has definitely
enhanced the ability of television broadcasts to flow freely across
national borders. In practice, however, it has not led to an
unrestricted free flow of transfrontier television in the 1990s. China,
and several other countries like Singapore and Malaysia, have
successfully devised national measures to prevent or restrict
transfrontier satellite television from reaching their nationals.
It is hard to predict when and under what circumstances the prior
consent principle will eventually collapse, whether it be from
technological advances, consequences of China’s entry into the WTO,
changes in China’s policies and leadership, or an interaction of some
or all these factors. It is even harder to predict how well Chinese
viewers would fare then: would media monopoly by the authoritarian
regime be replaced by the dominance of international media
conglomerates?
Even if the prior consent principle collapsed, regulatory issues
relating to transfrontier satellite television would not disappear
altogether. In the era of increasing transfrontier satellite television,
broadcasting sovereignty of nation-states is definitely shrinking. At
the same time, developed and developing countries alike are faced
with the growing problems of media concentration and private
monopoly, and of ensuring that the incoming television broadcasts
observe certain program standards. These issues, together with the
protection and promotion of media freedom, contain a strong
international dimension. Yet chances of reaching any international
treaty in the foreseeable future on either protection of the free flow
164. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, International Regulation of Direct Satellite
Broadcasting: Illusions and Alternatives, 3 European Journal of Communication 247
(1988).
165. Chan, supra n. 72, at 128.
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of information or regulation of transfrontier satellite television are
very slim. Nonetheless, “Television Without Frontiers” as
implemented in western Europe in the past decade may be worth
exploring as a model for regional cooperation.
